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RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF WILSON V. GARCIA:
CONTINUED CONFUSION TO A TROUBLED TOPIC
Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code provides a private
right of action for individuals wrongfully injured by anyone acting under
color of state authority.' Congress did not furnish section 1983 with a
statute of limitations. 2 Federal courts, under authority of section 1988 of
title 42 of the United States Code, borrowed the most analogous statute of
limitations from the forum state to provide section 1983 actions the limi-
tations periods they lacked.3 The federal courts' substitution of analogous
state statutes of limitations resulted in decades of confusion and uncertainty
over the proper characterization of section 1983 actions for statute of
limitations purposes. 4 The confusion led circuit courts to characterize section
1. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see infra note 12 (quoting text
of § 1983).
2. Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (1985).
3. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (directing federal courts to
borrow analogous state statutes when federal statutes do not furnish suitable remedies); see
infra note 25 (quoting text of § 1988).
4. See Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 643 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1938
(1985). In Garcia v. Wilson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated
that, in light of the varied factual circumstances producing civil rights violations and the
diversity of state statute of limitations, the court was not surprised that the circuit courts had
not uniformly characterized § 1983 for statute of limitations purposes. Id. In Garcia, the Tenth
Circuit surveyed the circuit courts' various approaches to characterizing § 1983 for statute of
limitations purposes. Id. at 64348. The First Circuit applied limitations periods for tort liability
to § 1983 actions. See Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315, 318-19
(Ist Cir. 1978). The First Circuit, however, also analogized § 1983 actions to specific common
law torts and applied the statute of limitations periods for those specific common law tort
actions to § 1983 claims. See Gashgai v. Leibowitz, 703 F.2d 10, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1983). The
First Circuit also held that a single statute of limitations should apply to most, if not all, §
1983 actions. See Walden, III, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 576 F.2d 945, 947 (1st Cir. 1978).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that courts should
characterize all § 1983 actions for statute of limitations purposes as actions on a liability
created by statute. See Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 861 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982). The Second Circuit found that the constitutional civil rights
protected by § 1983 were significantly different than state common law torts. Garcia, 731 F.2d
at 644. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that federal courts in
the Third Circuit should choose the limitations period that a state court would apply in the
forum state if a plaintiff brought the action under state law. See Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d
119, 123 (3rd Cir. 1974). The Third Circuit defined the civil rights cause of action in terms
of factually similar state actions as determined by the forum state's limitations scheme. Garcia,
731 F.2d at 645.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has applied the forum state's
personal injury statute of limitations to § 1983 actions. See Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200,
203 (4th Cir. 1972). The Fourth Circuit, however, broke its consistent pattern of applying a
state's personal injury statute of limitations by applying North Carolina's limitation period
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1983 in two contradictory manners. 5 Some circuit courts characterized section
for liability created by statute to all § 1983 claims arising in North Carolina. See Cole v.
Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1092 (4th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit rejected a state
statute of limitations expressly created for §1983 actions. See Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d
1316, 1318 (4th Cir. 1978). The Fourth Circuit held that the expressly created statute of
limitations period was too short and underestimated the § 1983 remedy. Id. at 1318-19.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has followed two lines of analysis
to determine the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 actions. See Shaw v. McCorkle,
537 F.2d 1289, 1292 (5th Cir. 1976). The first method required courts within the Fifth Circuit
to engage in a two-step analysis. Id. In the first step, a federal court must determine the
essential nature of the federal claim. Id. In the second step, a federal court must decide which
statute of limitations period applies to a similar state claim. Id. A court then must apply the
limitations period of the analogous state claim to the § 1983 claim. Id. The second line of
analysis directed a federal court to inquire which state statute of limitations the forum state
would enforce if the plaintiff brought an action seeking similar relief in state court. Id. Both
lines of analysis employed by the Fifth Circuit have led to inconsistent decisions. Garcia, 731
F.2d at 646. For example, Louisiana and Texas state courts have viewed unconstitutional
termination of employment as a tortious act, while Mississippi state courts have viewed the
same cause of action as a breach of contract. Jones v. Orleans Parish School Board, 688 F.2d
342, 344 (5th Cir. 1982) (Louisiana), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 951 (1983); see Moore v. El Paso
County, 660 F.2d 586, 589-90 (5th Cir. 1981) (Texas), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 822 (1982); White
v. United Parcel Service, 692 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1982) (Mississippi).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's characterization of § 1983 has
varied according to available state limitations periods. Garcia, 731 F.2d at 646. In Michigan,
state courts characterized employment discrimination as a personal injury for § 1983 purposes.
See Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564, 567 (6th Cir. 1969). Subsequent Sixth Circuit decisions
relating to actions arising in Ohio and Kentucky characterized employment discrimination as
a liability created by statute. See Mason v. Owens-Illinois Inc., 517 F.2d 520, 521-22 (6th Cir.
1975) (Ohio); Garner v. Stephens, 460 F.2d 1144, 1148 (6th Cir. 1972) (Kentucky). In other §
1983 actions, the Sixth Circuit adopted the limitations period for factually similar common
law torts. See Kilgore v. City of Mansfield, 679 F.2d 632, 633-34 (6th Cir. 1982).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit mended a split in its decisions
by holding that courts should characterize all § 1983 actions for limitations purposes as
statutory causes of action. See Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, Mitchell v. Beard, 438 U.S. 907 (1978). Courts within the Seventh Circuit, however,
have found it impossible to adhere to the Seventh Circuit's uniform characterization because
of the different lengths of the limitations periods in the states within the Seventh Circuit. See
Sacks Brothers Loan Co. v. Cunningham, 578 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1978).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has followed two inconsistent
lines of analysis for characterizing § 1983 for statute of limitations purposes. Garcia, 731 F.2d
at 647. One Eighth Circuit decision directed federal courts within the Eighth Circuit to
analogize the § 1983 cause of action to similar state common law torts. See Johnson v. Dailey,
479 F.2d 86, 88 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1009 (1973). Other Eighth Circuit
opinions, however, held that analogies to state common law torts are improper because a civil
rights claim is fundamentally different from a common law tort. See Lamb v. Amalgamated
Labor Life Ins. Co., 602 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1979). Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit adopted
the second line of analysis, which rejected analogies to common law torts and favored
characterizing § 1983 claims as a liability created by statute for limitations period purposes.
See Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400, 404 & 406 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998
(1982).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consistently has characterized
claims under § 1983 as actions on a liability created by statute. See Plummer v. Western
International Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit, however, also
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1983 actions in terms of the specific facts of each case. 6 Other circuit courts
characterized section 1983 actions in terms of an automatic general char-
acterization, applied regardless of the specific facts of the claim.7 Confronted
with this muddled situation, the United States Supreme Court attempted to
bring uniformity to circuit court decisions regarding section 1983 limitations
periods.
In Wilson v. Garcia,8 the United States Supreme Court attempted to
alleviate the confusion surrounding the proper characterization of section
1983 actions for statute of limitations purposes. The Supreme Court in
Wilson held that a uniform characterization of section 1983 actions for
statute of limitations purposes best advances the remedial purposes of section
1983. 9 The Wilson Court also held that a uniform characterization of section
1983 actions based on the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations
is the most appropriate comparison to the section 1983 cause of action. 10
Unfortunately, Wilson created a new confusion among the circuit courts
concerning whether the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Garcia should
receive retroactive application. Retroactive application of Wilson v. Garcia
would bar many section 1983 claims that accrued before the Supreme Court's
Wilson decision."
adopted an Oregon statute of limitations expressly created for § 1983 actions. See Kosikowski
v. Bourne, 659 F.2d 105, 107 (9th Cir. 1981); OR. REv. STAT. §30.275(3) (1977) (providing
two-year statute of limitations for actions commenced against public bodies or employees).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has employed several methods
of analysis to determine the appropriate limitations period for § 1983 actions. Garcia, 731
F.2d at 648-49. Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit adopted the forum state's personal injury
statute of limitations as the uniform characterization for all § 1983 claims. Id. at 651. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit, has directed
federal courts to determine which state statute of limitations the forum state would enforce if
the plaintiff had brought an action seeking similar relief in a state court. See Bonner v. City
of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (noting decision of Eleventh Circuit judges
to consider Fifth Circuit cases prior to September 30, 1981 as established precedent for the
new Eleventh Circuit).
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has based its §
1983 statute of limitations decisions on the assumption that the facts establishing the elements
peculiar to a § 1983 civil rights cause of action are simple to prove. See McClam v. Barry,
697 F.2d 366, 372-73 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The District of Columbia Circuit held that the § 1983
elements do not render the constitutional claim so different from the comparable state cause
of action that the particular state limitations period is inappropriate for a § 1983 action. Id.
5. See Garcia, 731 F.2d at 648. The circuit courts have disagreed whether courts should
characterize § 1983 claims in terms of the specific facts of the case or whether the courts
should apply a more general characterization, despite the particular facts of the case. See id.
at 643-48.; supra note 4 (discussing various approaches followed by circuit courts for charac-
terizing § 1983 claims for statute of limitations purposes).
6. Garcia, 731 F.2d at 648.
7. Id.
8. 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985).
9. Id. at 1945.
10. Id. at 1949.
11. See Id, at 1938 (Supreme Court decided Wilson v. Garcia on April 17, 1985).
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At the center of the retroactivity dilemma is section 1983 itself. Section
1983 provides a private right of action to any citizen of the United States
or any person within the jurisdiction of the United States who suffers a
deprivation of any constitutional or federal right, privilege, or immunity.'
2
The person depriving a section 1983 claimant of a constitutional right must
be acting under the sanction of a state statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage.
13
Congress initially enacted section 1983, originally entitled "The Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871,' 4 to aid terrorized blacks in the post-Civil War South. 5
Congress enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 to provide a measure of
federal control over state and territorial officials who were reluctant to
enforce state laws against individuals who violated the federal and consti-
tutional rights of the recently emancipated slaves and individuals who
sympathized with the Union cause.'
6
In recent years, the Supreme Court has extended section 1983 protection
to persons in every possession and territory of the United States. 7 In Monell
v. Department of Social Services,8 the Supreme Court overruled prior
Supreme Court precedent and held that municipal governments and their
officers could be liable under section 1983 for actions which violated the
civil rights of individuals within their jurisdictions.' 9 Because it opens the
federal courts to private citizens with grievances against state officials,
section 1983 offers a uniquely federal remedy against invasions of civil
rights under the alleged authority of state law.
20
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code
provides that
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, and Act of Con-
gress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
13. Id.
14. H.R. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 1st Sess, 1, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CoN G. &
AD. NEws 2609.
15. See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1871). In 1871, Senator Sherman of
Ohio dramatized the plight of black citizens in the post-Civil War South by reporting to
Congress the story of how ninety Ku Klux Klansmen stormed a prison at night and released
an individual accused of murdering a black man. Id.
16. Id.
17. H.R. REp. No. 548, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws. 2609, 2610.
18. See 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).).
19. Id. at 690-91.
20. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972). The Supreme Court in Mitchum v.
Foster observed that Congress modeled § 1983 after § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id.
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Congress originally did not establish a statute of limitations for section
1983, nor has any subsequent Congress passed legislation giving section
1983 a federally defined statute of limitations. 21 Such absences of explicit
limitations periods in federal statutory law are common. 22 By directing
federal courts to apply an analogous state statute of limitations, Congress
anticipates that the federal courts will rely on the wisdom of the states in
creating limitations periods. 23 Section 1988 of title 42 of the United States
Code instructs federal courts to apply the law of the state in which the
federal court decides the civil rights case.24 Section 1988 directs that, when
federal statutes provide an inadequate remedy or punishment, the common
law, as modified by the state in which the court resides, shall furnish the
necessary provisions.? A federal court may not borrow state common law
if the state law is inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United
States. 26
Federal courts use state statutes to limit the period of time during which
a plaintiff may bring a section 1983 action. In Burnett v. Grattan,27 the
Supreme Court discussed the application of section 1988 to section 1983
claims. 28 The Burnett Court construed section 1988 as directing federal
at 238; see Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 STAT. 27 (1866) (granting private right of action to
individuals whose civil rights were violated). The Court further stated that both § 1983 and §
2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as guardians of the Fourteenth Amendment, played an
important role in establishing the federal government as a protector of basic federal rights
against state power. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 238-39.
21. See Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1942 (Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts do not contain
specific limitations period governing § 1983 actions). But see id. at 1951 (O'Connor, J.
dissenting).
In her dissent to Wilson, Justice O'Connor noted that Congress, at least three times, has pro-
posed standardized § 1983 limitations periods and all three proposals failed. Id. Justice
O'Connor stated that the Supreme Court normally would perceive a failed proposal as a
persuasive indication that Congress does not see a need for uniform limitations periods for §
1983 claims. Id.
22. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980).
23. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975) (controlling
limitations period ordinarily would be most appropriate period provided by state law).
24. Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1942; Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); see
infra note 25 (quoting text of § 1988).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Section 1988 of title 42 of the United States Code
provides that
[I]n all cases where they [federal statutes] are not adapted to the object, or are
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses
against the law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal
cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial
and disposition of the cause, and if, it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of
punishment on the party found guilty.
Id.
26. Id.
27. 468 U.S. 42 (1984).
28. Id. at 47-48.
1987]
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courts to follow a three part test to determine which rules of decision are
applicable to civil rights claims. 29 The first part of the test requires courts
to follow the laws of the United States to the extent that the federal statutes
effectuate the civil rights statutes. 30 Part two requires courts to apply the
law of the forum state if no appropriate federal law exists. 31 Finally, part
three directs courts to apply state law only if the state law is not inconsistent
with the federal Constitution or federal laws.
32
The conflict and confusion concerning the appropriate limitations period
for section 1983 actions culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in
Wilson v. Garcia. Prior to Wilson, the Supreme Court had offered some
guidance for determining the proper limitations period for section 1983
actions.3  For example, in Board of Regents v. Tomanio34 the Supreme
Court directed federal courts to borrow the most analogous state statute of
limitations to bar tardily commenced section 1983 proceedings.
35
Confronted by the Supreme Court's consistent command to borrow the
most analogous state limitations period, the circuit courts have developed
two methods to determine which state statute of limitations is most analo-
gous to the plaintiff's section 1983 claim.3 6 The first method requires a
federal court to examine the "essential nature" of the federal claim.37 After
determining the essential nature of the claim, a court must decide which
state claim is of the same general category and aplily that claim's statute
of limitations.38 The second method of determining the proper limitations
period requires a federal court to choose the appropriate limitations period
based upon how a state court, faced with a similar claim, would characterize
29. Id.
30. Id. at 48.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975) (controlling
limitations period ordinarily would be most appropriate period provided by state law); Auto
Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966) (state statutes supply periods
of limitation for federal causes of action when federal legislation is silent); O'Sullivan v. Felix,
233 U.S. 318, 322 (1914) (fact that action arises under federal law does not preclude federal
court from applying state limitations period).
34. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
35. Id. at 483-86.
36. See Jarmie, Selecting an Analogous State Limitations Statute in Reconstruction Civil
Rights Acts Claims: The Tenth Circuit's Resolution, 15 N.M.L. REv. 11, 18 (1985) (failure of
federal courts to achieve consensus on statutory selection results from disagreement over
appropriate analytical method to employ).
37. Id. In Nathan Rodgers Const. & Realty Corp. v. City of Saraland, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that characterizing the essential nature of an action
is more particularized than considering the claim to be a statutory cause of action or a § 1983
action. 670 F.2d 16, 17 n.4. (5th Cir. 1982). The Fifth Circuit held that the essential nature
of the claim is found in the gravamen of each individual claim. Id.
38. See, e.g., Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260, 1261 (5th Cir. 1977); Bell
v. Aerodex Inc., 473 F.2d 869, 871 (5th Cir. 1973); Franklin v. City of Marks, 439 F.2d 665,
669 (5th Cir. 1971); McGuire v. Baker, 421 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 820 (1970).
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the action.3 9 The distinction between the two methods is that, under the
essential nature method, a court characterizes a section 1983 claim utilizing
federal law, while under the state characterization method, a court char-
acterizes a section 1983 claim based almost entirely on state law.4 0 The
distinction between the two methods apparently is more theoretical than
actual. In Shaw v. McCorkle,4' for example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that both methods of characterizing
section 1983 claims substantially depend on state law.42
The facts of Wilson v. Garcia are typical of a section 1983 action for
excessive use of force by police during an arrest. Plaintiff Garcia claimed
that defendant Wilson, a New Mexico State Police officer, beat Garcia,
sprayed him with tear gas, and unlawfully arrested him. 43 Garcia further
alleged that defendant Vigil, Chief of the New Mexico State Police, had
notice of Wilson's violent propensities and that Vigil had failed to reprimand
Wilson on other occasions when Wilson had committed unprovoked at-
tacks." Finally, Garcia alleged that Vigil's training and supervision of Wilson
was deficient.4 5
On January 28, 1982, two years and nine months after the claim arose,
Garcia brought a section 1983 action against Wilson and Vigil in the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico seeking money damages
for deprivations of his fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights and
for personal injury suffered as a result of acts committed by the defendants
under color of state law.46 Wilson and Vigil moved to dismiss the action
on the ground that a two year statute of limitations governed the action.4 7
In moving to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds, Wilson and Vigil
relied on the New Mexico Supreme Court's holding in DeVargas v. New
Mexico.41 In DeVargas, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the Tort
Claims Act, which governs tort actions against governmental entities and
public employees in New Mexico, provided the state cause of action most
39. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 405 (5th Cir. 1974); Knowles v.
Carson, 419 F.2d 369, 370 (5th Cir. 1969).
40. Shaw v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289, 1292 (5th Cir. 1976).
41. 537 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1976).
42. Id. at 1293; see also Ingram, 547 F.2d at 1261 (mechanical application of state law
generally subordinates federal interests).




47. Id. In Wilson v. Garcia, defendants Wilson and Vigil sought to dismiss plaintiff
Garcia's claim under § 41-4-15(A) of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. Id. Section 41-4-15(A)
provides that:
Actions against a governmental entity or a public employee for torts shall be forever
barred, unless such action is commenced within two years after the date of occurrence
resulting in loss, injury or death. ...
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(A) (1978).
48. 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982).
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closely analogous to section 1983 claims. 49 The New Mexico Supreme Court,
therefore, concluded that the statute of limitations for section 1983 actions
brought in New Mexico was the two year statute of limitations provided by
the Tort Claims Act.50
The district court in Garcia concluded that the New Mexico Supreme
Court's decision in DeVargas was not controlling because the rights protected
by section 1983 are a matter of federal, rather than state, law.' The district
court concluded that section 1983 actions are best characterized as actions
based on statute and, therefore, the New Mexico Tort Claims Act does not
govern section 1983 claims.2 The district court denied Wilson and Virgil's
motion to dismiss and certified an interlocutory appeal."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit granted the
interlocutory appeal. 54 After the parties argued before a three judge panel
and reargued before the entire Court of Appeals, the Tenth Circuit unani-
mously affirmed the district court's denial of Wilson and Vigil's motion to
dismiss. 55 The Tenth Circuit reviewed the circuit courts' varying approaches
for characterizing section 1983 claims for limitations purposes and found
that no uniform characterization of section 1983 for statute of limitations
-purposes had evolved.5 6 The Tenth Circuit concluded that a uniform char-
acterization of section 1983 actions furthers the federal values at issue in
selecting a limitations period for section 1983 claims.57 The Tenth Circuit,
therefore, held that all section 1983 claims are actions for personal injuries.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Wilson, noting that the conflict
and confusion surrounding section 1983 statute of limitations questions
provided compelling reasons for hearing the case.5 9
49. 97 N.M. at , 642 P.2d at 167.
50. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(A) (1978) (plaintiff must initiate action against
government entity or public employee within two years after injury occurs).
51. Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1941.
52. Id. The Supreme Court in Wilson noted that, because New ,Mexico does not have a
limitations period for actions based on a statute, the district court applied New Mexico's
residual statute of limitations to Garcia's .§ 1983 claim. Id. Section 37-1-4 of the New Mexico
Code provides that "all other actions not herein otherwise .provided for and specified [must
be brought] within four years." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (1978).
53. Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1941.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.; see supra note 4 (discussing approaches followed by circuit courts in determining
§ 1983 limitations periods).
57. Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1941; see infra notes 65 & 66 and accompanying text (discussing
federal values at issue in selecting limitations period for § 1983 claims).
58. See Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1941. The Tenth Circuit in Garcia v. Wilson, held that §
37-1-8 of the New Mexico Code governed § 1983 actions in New Mexico. Garcia v. Wilson,
731 F.2d 640, 651 (10th. Cir. 1984). Section 37-1-8 of the New Mexico Code provides that
"Actions. . .for an injury to the person or reputation of any person [must be brought] within
three years." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978). The Supreme Court in Wilson, therefore,
concluded that Garcia had filed his § 1983 claim before the running of the statute of limitations.
Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1941.
59. Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1942.
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In affirming the Tenth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court in Wilson
v. Garcia held that federal courts may best characterize section 1983 claims
as personal injury actions. 6 The Supreme Court agreed with the Tenth Cir-
cuit's conclusion that the primary purpose of section 1988 was not to borrow
the policies and purposes of the states concerning civil rights matters.' The
Supreme Court reasoned that, if the choice of the limitations period depends
on the particular facts or legal theories of a case, counsel always could argue
that several statutes of limitations are applicable.62 The Supreme Court con-
cluded that federal interests in a uniform characterization of section 1983's
statute of limitations, the litigant's interest in the certainty of limitations
periods, and the public's interest in minimizing unnecessary litigation support
the Court's characterization of section 1983 actions as personal injury claims.
63
In concluding that a state's personal injury statute of limitations was
the most appropriate characterization of the limitations period for section
1983 actions, the Supreme Court noted that the consistently large volume
of personal injury litigation in state courts makes it unlikely that states
would fLx or limit personal injury statutes of limitation to discriminate
against section 1983 federal claims. 64 The Supreme Court also considered
the underlying purposes of section 1983 in its decision to adopt the forum
state's personal injury statute of limitations as the uniform limitations period
for section 1983 actions.6 The Court recognized that section 1983 actions
generate peace and justice through civil enforcement and protect the rights
secured by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
66
Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that, because the ineffectiveness of
state remedies initially led Congress to enact section 1983, Congress would
60. Id. at 1947.
61. Id. at 1943-44. In Wilson, the Supreme Court stated that adopting the policies and
purposes of the states concerning civil rights actions is not the primary purpose of the
borrowing provision of § 1988. Id. The Court noted that Congress would not assign to state
courts and legislatures a decisive role in the formative function of defining and characterizing
the elements of a federal cause of action. Id. at 1944.
62. Id. at 1946. In Polite v. Diehl, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held differing statute of limitations applicable to a plaintiff's cause of action. 507 F.2d
119, 123 (3rd Cir. 1974). In Polite, the plaintiff alleged that police officers unlawfully arrested
him, beat him, sprayed him with mace, coerced confessions from him, and towed his
automobile. Id. at 121. The Third Circuit held that a one-year false arrest statute of limitations
applied to the cause of action alleging false arrest, a two-year personal injury statute of
limitations applied to the cause of action alleging assault and battery and coerced confessions,
and that a six-year statute of limitations for actions seeking the recovery of goods applied to
the cause of action alleging unlawful seizure of the automobile. Id. at 124.
63. Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1947.
64. Id. at 1949.
65. Id. at 1947.
66. See id. at 1947-49. In Wilson, the Supreme Court stated that the fourteenth amend-
ment unequivocally recognizes the equal status of every person. Id. at 1948. The Court also
noted that, because the Constitution commands due process and equal protection of the laws
to all persons, a violation of that command is an injury to the individual rights of that person.
Id.
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not have characterized section 1983 as analogous to state remedies for torts
committed by public officials. 67 Justice Stevens, author of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Wilson v. Garcia, stated that it was the Court's intention
to ensure that the important purposes of section 1983 receive a sweep as
broad as its language.68
Although the Supreme Court in Wilson settled the issue of the proper
characterization of section 1983 for statute of limitations purposes, the
Court did not address whether the circuit courts should apply the Wilson
decision retroactively. The United States Supreme Court, however, previ-
ously established a test to determine whether a federal court's decision in
a civil case should receive retroactive or prospective application. 69 Although
judicial decisions normally receive retroactive application,7 0 the Supreme
Court, in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,71 provided a three part test to determine
whether a court's holding should receive prospective application. 72 First, to
receive prospective application, a decision must establish a new principle of
law.73 To establish a new principle of law, a decision must overrule clear
precedent upon which litigants have relied; or decide an issue of first
impression that the court's previous decisions did not foreshadow.7 4 Second,
a court must examine the history and the purpose of the new principle of
law to determine whether retroactive application of the new principle of
law will further the law's purpose. 75 Third, a court must decide whether
retroactive application of the decision would be inequitable.
7 6
The Supreme Court in Chevron did not indicate the relative importance
of, or the relationship between, the factors a court must consider in
67. Id. at 1949.
68. Id. at 1945.
69. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971).
70. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 486 n. 16 (1981)
(overwhelming weight of authority supports retroactive application of court's decisions); Scott
v. Local 863, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 725 F.2d 226, 228 (3rd Cir. 1984) (federal courts should
apply the law in effect at time court adjudicates case).
71. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
72. See Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07. The Supreme Court set forth its retroactivity test
in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson as follows:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of
law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or
by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshad-
owed. Second it has been stressed that "we must... weigh the merits and demerits
in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and
effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation."
Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for
"[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if
applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or
hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity."
Id. (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 106.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 106-07.
76. Id. at 107.
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determining whether a case should receive retroactive application. 77 Some
federal courts examining the Wilson retroactivity question, however, have
agreed that the first Chevron factor, the reliance factor, is the most
important factor of the retroactivity test.78 Although no court has addressed
the importance of the second Chevron factor, it appears that the second
factor receives minimal attention in the circuit court's decisions concerning
the retroactivity of Wilson v. Garcia. Federal courts also have concluded
that the third Chevron factor, the equity factor, is so intertwined with the
reliance factor that it is impossible for a court's positive finding on the
reliance factor to lead to a negative finding on the equity factor. 79 The
77. Note, Confusion in Federal Courts: Application of the Chevron Test in Retroactive
-Prospective Decisions, 1985 U. ILL. L. REa. 117, 133. Lower courts struggling to apply the
Chevron test have developed three methods of analyzing the three factors of the Chevron test.
Id. The Chevron test consists of the reliance factor, the purpose factor, and the equity factor.
Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07. The first method of analyzing the three factors of the Chevron
test is the balancing method. Note, supra at 133. Under the balancing method, a court must
weigh the factors and favor the factors that most strongly decide the issue. Id. If two out of
three Chevron factors favor retroactivity, the court applies the decision retroactively. Id., see
Occhino v. United States, 686 F.2d 1302, 1308-09 (8th Cir. 1982) (under Chevron, courts
weigh factors to determine whether decision receives retroactive application); Cash v. Califano,
621 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir. 1980) (courts apply Chevron factors by analyzing how factors
interact with one another). The second method of analyzing the Chevron factors is the
threshold method. Note, Supra at 133. The threshold method directs courts to disregard the
second and third Chevron factors, unless the first Chevron factor favors retroactive application.
Id., see Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 789 (2d Cir. 1980) (unless plaintiff
establishes that facts satisfy first Chevron factor consideration of other two factors is unnec-
essary), aff'd 102 S. Ct. 1883 (1982). The third method is the comprehensive method. Note
Supra, at 133. The comprehensive method requires courts to apply a decision retroactively
unless all three Chevron factors favor prospective application. Id.; see Cochran v. Birkel, 651
F.2d 1219, 1223 n.8 (6th Cir. 1981) (all three Chevron factors must favor prospective application
before court will deny retroactive effect), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1152 (1982); Schaefer v. First
Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287, 1294 (7th Cir. 1975) (courts apply doctrine of
non-retroactivity if all three Chevron factors favor prospective application), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 943 (1976).
78. See, e.g., Farmer v. Cook, 782 F.2d 780, 781 (8th Cir. 1986) (most important
Chevron factor is whether retroactivity will disappoint reliance interest of party); Richard H.
v. Clay County, 639 F. Supp. 578, 579 (D. Minn. 1986) (court should apply most important
Chevron factor, plaintiff's reliance interest, to facts before finding that Wilson should receive
retroactive application); Chris N. v. Burnsville, 634 F. Supp. 1402, 1406 (D. Minn. 1986)
(first, and most important, Chevron factor requires proof that plaintiff reasonably relied on
prior statute of limitations in delaying filing of § 1983 claim); John Does 1-100 v. Ninneman,
634 F. Supp. 341, 344 (D. Minn. 1986) (concluding that first Chevron factor is most important
factor).
79. See Fitzgerald v. Larson, 769 F.2d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 1985) (third Chevron factor
overlaps with first factor); Waz v. Gallagher, No. 29 c 2314 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 1986) (available
on Oct. 10, 1986, WasTLAw, Allfeds library, Dist file) (third and first Chevron factors protect
same values); Winston v. Sanders, 610 F. Supp. 176, 178 (C.D. Ill. 1985) (same). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Fitzgerald v. Larson explained the relationship
between the first and third Chevron factors. 769 F.2d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 1985). The Third
Circuit, in Fitzgerald, observed that the equity factor would not allow retroactive application
of Wilson when the reliance factor established that the plaintiff had relied on the established
law of the circuit. Id.
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Chevron test, therefore, revolves around the reliance factor. A court's
decision concerning the reliance factor of the Chevron test often resolves
the Wilson retroactivity issue.80
Many of the circuit courts have confronted the question of whether to
apply the Wilson decision retroactively."' Most of the circuit courts con-
fronted with the Wilson retroactivity issue have applied the Chevron test to
resolve the issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
addressed the issue of Wilson's retroactive application in Small v. Inhabit-
ants of City of Belfast. 2 In Small, the First Circuit held that the Supreme
Court's decision in Wilson should receive retroactive application.83 The First
80. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (discussing importance of first Chevron
factor and relationship between first and third Chevron factors).
81. See infra notes 82-177 and accompanying text (discussing circuit courts' decisions
regarding retroactive application of Wilson). To date, the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have addressed the Wilson retroactivity issue. See
id. (discussing various circuit court's decisions regarding retroactive application of Wilson).
The Third Circuit has extended the Wilson decision beyond § 1983 claims. See Goodman
v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 117-20 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 568 (1986).
In Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., the Third Circuit applied the Wilson decision to § 1981
claims. Id. Section 1981 of title 42 of the United States Code provides that
[aIll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishments, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to
no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson, the Third Circuit treated § 1981 statute
of limitations problems in the same manner as § 1983 statute of limitations problems. Goodman,
777 F.2d at 119. The Third Circuit stated that it was significant that § 1988 applied to both
§ 1983 and § 1981 for statute of limitations purposes. Id. The Third Circuit also observed
that a substantial overlap existed in the type of claims brought under §§ 1981 and 1983. Id.
at 120. The Third Circuit adopted Pennsylvania's two-year personal injury statute of limitations
for personal injury for § 1981 claims. Id. The Third Circuit previously had adopted the two-
year personal injury statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. See Smith v. City of Pittsburgh,
764 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct.349 (1985). The Third Circuit in Goodman
agreed with the Smith Court's conclusion that the Wilson decision should receive retroactive
application. Goodman, 777 F.2d at 120. In Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, the Third
Circuit again addressed the question of whether Wilson should receive retroactive application
in § 1981 actions. 784 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1986), cert granted in part, 107 S.Ct. 62 (1986). After
analyzing the facts, utilizing the Chevron test, the Third Circuit held that Wilson would not
receive retroactive application. Id. at 514. The Third Circuit found that the reliance factor
and the equity factor favored prospective application, while the purpose factor was neutral.
Id.
82. 796 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986).
83. Id. at 545-46. In Small v. Inhabitants of City of Belfast, the plaintiff brought a §
1983 action against the City of Belfast, Maine for deprivation of his property interest in his
position as a special police officer, without due process. Id. at 545. The United States District
Court for the District of Maine held that a Maine two-year statute of limitations applicable
to defamation, assault and battery, false imprisonment, and medical malpractice was the most
analogous personal injury limitations period to apply to § 1983 actions brought in Maine.
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Circuit revived the plaintiff's section 1983 claim by retroactively applying
the applicable statute of limitations.8 The First Circuit, however, did not
set forth its analysis of the Chevron test. The First Circuit merely stated,
in a footnote, that it believed that its decision was consistent with Chevron
and that permitting Small's claim furthered the federal policies embodied
in section 1983.85 The First Circuit, therefore, retroactively applied Wilson.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit first addressed
the Wilson retroactivity issue in Smith v. City of Pittsburgh.16 The Third
Circuit applied the Chevron test to analyze the. Smith case. 7 In analyzing
the first Chevron factor of whether Wilson established a new principle of
law, the Third Circuit conceded that Wilson overturned Third Circuit
precedent. 8 The Third Circuit, however, cited its previous decision in Perez
v. Dana Corp., Parish Frame Div.8 9 for the proposition that, when the
precedent of an area of law is erratic, a subsequent Supreme Court decision
that overrules the erratic precedent does not satisfy the first Chevron factor. 9°
Small v. Inhabitants of City of Belfast, 617 F. Supp. 1567, 1573 (D. Me. 1985) rev'd 796
F.2d 544 (1st Cir.1986); see ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 753 (1964) (prescribing two-year
limitations period for actions for assault and battery, false imprisonment, slander, libel, and
medical malpractice). The district court in Small adopted the intentional personal injury statute
of limitations because it reasoned that intentional tort6 directly infringe on personal rights.
Small, 617 F. Supp. at 1573.
In reversing the district court, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
adopted Maine's personal injury statute of limitations for all other personal injury actions,
except those instituted against professionals, as the correct statute of limitations for § 1983
actions. Id. at 546; see ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752 (1964) (prescribing a six-year
statute of limitations for all personal injuries not provided for in ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 753 (1964). The First Circuit in Small based its decision on the Supreme Court's decision
in Wilson, evaluations of Maine statutes of limitation, and analysis of other federal cases
adopting personal injury statutes of limitation. Small, 796 F.2d at 546.
84. Small, 796 F.2d at 549.
85. Id. at 549 n.6.
86. 764 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1985) cert. denied 106 S.Ct. 349 (1985). In Smith v. City of
Pittsburgh, the plaintiff, a garbage collector employed by the Pittsburgh Department of
Environmental Services, brought a § 1983 action against the City of Pittsburgh for wrongful
discharge from employment without due process. Id. at 189.
87. Id. at 194.
88. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Smith v. City of
Pittsburgh, observed that the district courts in the Third Circuit were divided on the question
of which state limitations period to apply to § 1983 claims for unconstitutional termination
of employment without due process, both before and during the period between Smith's
termination and the filing of his § 1983 claim. Id. at 195. The Smith court observed that the
Third Circuit decided the cases that established a definite statute of limitations for termination
of employment without due process after Smith filed his § 1983 claim. Id. Because the Third
Circuit decided the precedent that Wilson v. Garcia overturned after Smith filed his § 1983
claim, Smith could not have relied on those statute of limitations in waiting to bring his §
1983 claim. Id.; see supra notes 43-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
decision in Wilson).
89. 718 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1983).
90. Id. at 585-88; see supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit
precedent overturned by Wilson).
19871
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:135
The first Chevron factor states that a court's decision must overrule clear
precedent to permit the court's decision to receive retroactive application. 9'
The Third Circuit also concluded that the first Chevron factor was not met
because Smith could not have relied on Third Circuit precedent for a statute
of limitations longer than two years. The court in Smith explained that the
large majority of section 1983 cases decided in the Third Circuit had
limitations periods between six months and two years and, therefore, Third
Circuit precedent provided no basis for Smith's reliance on a statute of
limitations longer than two yearsY2 In analyzing the second Chevron factor
of whether retroactive application of a subsequent decision furthers that
decision's effect, the Smith Court, with scant discussion, concluded that the
purposes of Wilson do not favor clearly either retroactive or prospective
application. 93 In analyzing the third Chevron factor of whether retroactive
application of a decision is equitable, the Third Circuit emphasized that
Smith reasonably could not have relied on a limitations period longer than
two years and that Smith had not engaged in massive discovery. 94 Although
finding that equity did not support the retroactive application of the Supreme
Court's Wilson decision in Smith, the Third Circuit hinted that retroactive
application of Wilson might be inequitable after a plaintiff has incurred
extensive legal expenses.95 The Third Circuit's Chevron analysis in Smith,
therefore, favored retroactive application of Wilson v. Garcia.
96
In Fitzgerald v. Larson,97 the Third Circuit followed the precedent
established in Smith.9 Fitzgerald based his section 1983 claim on wrongful
discharge for exercise of first amendment rights,99 while Smith based his
91. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing first Chevron factor).
92. See Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 1985) (Third Circuit
found only one decision supporting application of statute of limitations period suggested by
plaintiff); see also Yatzor v. Allen, 365 F. Supp. 875, 876 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (holding that six-
year statute of limitations is appropriate for § 1983 claim for unconstitutional termination of
employment without due process) aff'd 503 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974) cert. denied 420 U.S.
929 (1975).
93. Smith, 764 F.2d at 196.
94. Id. at 195-96.
95. See id. at 196 (noting that, although summary judgment proceedings were lengthy,
plaintiff did not engage in massive discovery and, thereby incur costly legal fees); see also
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971) (terminating lawsuit after lengthy and
costly discovery stages would be inequitable to the plaintiff).
96. See Smith, 764 F.2d at 196. The Third Circuit in Smith v, City of Pittsburgh
concluded that applying Wilson v. Garcia retroactively to bar plaintiff's claim would not be
inequitable or harsh to Smith. Id.
97. 769 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1985).
-98. Id. at 164; see Smith, 764 F.2d at 188 (holding that Supreme Court's decision in
Wilson deserved retroactive application).
99. Fitzgerald v. Larson, 769 F.2d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1985). In Fitzgerald v. Larson, the
plaintiff, a nontenured employee of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, brought
a § 1983 action against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
claiming that the plaintiff's discharge from his job violated his first amendment rights. Id. at
161. Fitzgerald contended that his discharge from employment resulted solely from the fact
that he was a member of the Democratic Party. Id.
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section 1983 claim on wrongful discharge without procedural due process.1°°
Because of the substantially different grounds for the cases, the Third
Circuit found that Fitzgerald's section 1983 claim presented a somewhat
different question from Smith's section 1983 claim.101 The Third Circuit,
however, concluded that the limitations period decisions for wrongful dis-
charge for exercise of first amendment rights were as erratic and unclear as
the decisions discussed in Smith. 10 2 The Fitzgerald court examined the second
Chevron factor and concurred with the Smith court that the purpose factor
does not favor clearly either retroactive or prospective application. 03 The
Third Circuit concluded that no inequity would result from applying Wilson
retroactively because the plaintiff relied on cases decided by the Third
Circuit before Pennsylvania revised its statute of limitations.' 4 Like its
decision in Smith, the Third Circuit's decision in Fitzgerald favored retro-
active application of Wilson v. Garcia.05
In Bartholomew v. Fischl,'06 the Third Circuit addressed an interesting
twist on the facts of Smith. In Bartholomew, applying the Wilson decision
retroactively would extend the plaintiff's limitation period, while applying
Wilson prospectively would bar the plaintiff's claim. 0 7 The Third Circuit
100. Id.; see Smith, 764 F.2d at 189 (Smith claimed he was discharged from employment
by City of Pittsburgh without proper notice and opportunity to contest charges).
101. Fitzgerald, 769 F.2d at 163; see infra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing
first amendment § 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania prior to 1976 revision of Pennsylvania
statutes).
102. Fitzgerald, 769 F.2d at 164.
103. Id.; see Smith, 764 F.2d at 196 (policies of Wilson do not favor clearly retroactive
or prospective application).
104. See Fitzgerald, 769 F.2d at 163-64. Prior to 1976, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit had applied Pennsylvania's six-year residuary provision to § 1983 claims
involving allegations of a failure by the state to renew employment contracts in violation of
the first amendment. Id.; see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. Am. § 5527(6) (Purdon 1981) (providing
six-year limitations period for all actions not covered by another statute of limitations). The
Third Circuit applied the residuary provision because Pennsylvania had no statute of limitations
for wrongful interference with a contract. Fitzgerald, 769 F.2d at 163. When Pennsylvania
revised its statutes in 1976, however, the Pennsylvania State Legislature included economic
injury in the two-year limitations provision. Id.; see 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5524 (Purdon
1981) (providing two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries caused by wrongful act
or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another). In Fitzgerald, all three cases on
which the plaintiff relied were decided under Pennsylvania law prior to the 1976 revision.
Fitzgerald, 769 F.2d at 164.
105. Id. at 164.
106. 782 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir. 1986). In Bartholomew v. Fischl, the plaintiff, acting director
of the BiCity Health Bureau, brought a § 1983 action claiming that the BiCity Health Bureau
terminated his employment without due process because of a disagreement concerning whether
Allentown, Pennsylvania's drinking water should be fluoridated. Id. at 1149-50.
107. See id. at 1154-55. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Bartholomew v. Fischl, analogized Bartholomew's § 1983 claim to a defamation claim brought
under state law. Id. at 1155. Pennsylvania has a one-year statute of limitations for defamation
actions. Id. at 1154; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5523(1) (Purdon 1981). Under Wilson v.
Garcia, Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury governs Bartholo-
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concluded that, prior to Wilson, no clear limitations period precedent existed
upon which the defendants could have relied to bar the plaintiff's section
1983 claim. 108 The Bartholomew court, therefore, found that the first
Chevron factor favored retroactive application of Wilson.10 In examining
the second Chevron factor, the Third Circuit held that the purposes of
Wilson are best served by retroactive application." 0 The Third Circuit
concluded that retroactive application of Wilson was not inequitable because
the defendants did not raise their statute of limitations argument until two
years after the plaintiff filed his section 1983 claim."' The Third Circuit
reasoned that, after two years, the defendant's claim that he relied upon a
one-year statute of limitations was unreasonable.1 2 Ironically, the Third
Circuit's decision in Bartholomew applied Wilson retroactively to preserve,
rather than destroy, the plaintiff's cause of action." 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit apparently
addressed the Wilson retroactivity issue in Gates v. Spinks.Y4 After deciding
which of Mississippi's two statutes of limitations for personal injury was
applicable to section 1983 claims, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
applicable personal injury statute of limitations governs all section 1983
actions brought in Mississippi." 5 The Fifth Circuit did not mention the
mew's § 1983 claim. Bartholomew, 782 F.2d at 1155-56. Bartholomew filed his § 1983 action
one year and nine months after his cause of action accrued. Id. at 1150-51. If Wilson received
retroactive application, Bartholomew's action was timely under the two-year personal injury
statute of limitations. Id. at 1155. If, however, the court applied Wilson prospectively,
Bartholomew's action would be time-barred by the one-year defamation statute of limitations.
Id.
108. See Bartholomew, 782 F.2d at 1155-56. In Bartholomew v. Fischl, the Third Circuit
held that no clear precedent existed justifying the defendant's reliance on the one-year
defamation statute of limitations, rather than the two-year personal injury statute of limitations.
Id. at 1155. The Third Circuit stated that, even if precedent established the one-year defamation
provision as the appropriate limitations period, Bartholomew alternatively claimed that the
BiCity Health Bureau violated his first amendment rights. Id. In Fitzgerald v. Larson, the
Third Circuit established that Pennsylvania's six-year residual statute of limitations was
applicable to § 1983 actions based on the first amendment. Fitzgerald v. Larson, 741 F.2d 32,
36 (3d Cir. 1984) vacated 471 U.S. 1051 (1985). Thus, even if the Third Circuit denied
retroactive application of Wilson, Fitzgerald's action was not time-barred. Bartholomew, 782
F.2d at 1155-56.
109. Bartholomew, 782 F.2d at 1155-56.
110. Id. at 1156.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. (retroactive application of Wilson to Bartholomew's § 1983 action saves
action because Bartholomew initiated action within two-year personal injury statute of limi-
tations established by Wilson).
114. 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 106 S.Ct. 1378 (1986).
115. Id. at 920. In Gates v. Spinks, the plaintiff, a public school teacher, brought a §
1983 dction claiming wrongful termination of employment in retribution for the exercising of
her first amendment rights. Id. at 917. In Gates, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit concluded that Mississippi's one-year statute of limitations for most common law
intentional torts, rather than Mississippi's six- year residual statute of limitations for most
unintentional torts, was the appropriate personal injury statute of limitations for § 1983
purposes. Id. at 919-20.
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concept of retroactivity or the Chevron test in the Gates decision. Despite
the absence of discussion concerning the issue of retroactivity, the Fifth
Circuit intended Gates to apply to all section 1983 claims, regardless of
when the claim accrued.1
6
The sole decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit regarding the Wilson retroactivity issue is Mulligan v. Hazard."7 In
examining the question of retroactivity in Mulligan, the Sixth Circuit ap-
proached the issue in a manner different from other circuit courts consid-
ering the Wilson retroactivity issue. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the
Supreme Court in Wilson did not address expressly the issue of retroactivity,
but that the Supreme Court merely implied that the Wilson decision applies
retroactively." 8 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court was
applying retroactively its decision affirming the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's decision in Garcia that the appropriate
statute of limitations for all section 1983 actions is the forum state's personal
injury limitations period." 9 In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit
relied on the similarity between the Supreme Court's decisions in Wilson
and DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 20 The Sixth
Circuit previously had concluded that the Supreme Court implied that the
116. Id. at 920. In Young v. Biggers, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Mississippi applied the Chevron test to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Gates v.
Spinks and concluded that the decision in Gates met all the Chevron factors necessary for
retroactive application. 630 F. Supp. 590, 591-92 (N.D. Miss. 1986). The district court in
Young held that retroactive application of Gates is equivalent to retroactive application of
Wilson. Id. at 591-92.
117. 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2903 (1986). In Mulligan v.
Hazard, the plaintiff, a University of Ohio professor, brought a § 1983 action claiming that
the University of Ohio unconstitutionally restricted her tenure rights in violation of the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause and the first and fifth amendments by altering
University of Ohio tenure requirements. Id. at 341.
118. Id. at 343-44; see Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985) (holding that forum
state's personal injury statute of limitations best characterizes § 1983 actions for statute of
limitations purposes).
119. Mulligan, 777 F.2d at 343.
120. 462 U.S. 151 (1983). The United States Supreme Court in DelCostello v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters held that a six-month statute of limitations period applied to suits
brought by an employee against his employer and his union for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 169. The Court held that the six-month limitations period accommodates
the national interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements, as
well as an employee's interest in setting aside an unjust settlement under the collective bargaining
system. Id. at 171 (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1981)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. General Motors Corp.
concluded that the Supreme Court in DelCostello implied that the statute of limitations rule
that the Court established in DelCostello should receive retroactive application. Smith v.
General Motors Corp., 747 F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 1984); see DelCostello, 462 U.S. 169
(holding that six-month limitations period applied to claim by employee against employer and
union). The Sixth Circuit in Mulligan v. Hazard held that the Wilson and DelCostello decisions
are analogous because both decisions imply that the appropriate statute of limitations that the
Supreme Court chose in Wilson and DelCostello should receive retroactive application. Mulligan
v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1985).
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Court's holding in DelCostello regarding the statute of limitations should
receive retroactive application.' 2 The Mulligan court failed to mention the
Chevron test or the reason for not mentioning the test. The Sixth Circuit
reaffirmed Mulligan in two subsequent decisions.1
2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Anton
v. Lehpamer,-3 first addressed the Wilson retroactivity question. The Anton
Court employed the Chevron test to determine the issue of retroactivity.' 24
Prior to Wilson, the Seventh Circuit uniformly applied the Illinois' residuary
statute of limitations to all section 1983 claims brought in Illinois.'2 Wilson
overruled clear precedent in the Seventh Circuit and, therefore, satisfied the
first Chevron factor.126 In analyzing the second Chevron factor, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that prospective application of Wilson would not frustrate
the interests of uniformity and minimization of litigation and that retroactive
application of Wilson would frustrate the federal interest of safeguarding
litigants' rights. 127 The Seventh Circuit concluded that retroactive application
of Wilson would serve no legitimate purpose and would impose a hardship
on plaintiffs who innocently had pursued their section 1983 claims.' 2s The
121. Smith v. General Motors Corp. 747 F.2d 372, 373-75 (6th Cir. 1984); see DelCostello,
462 U.S. at 169 (holding that six-month limitations period applied to claim by employee against
employer and union). The Sixth Circuit in Smith v. General Motors Corp. held that the
Supreme Court in DelCostello could have reserved the issue of retroactivity, or could have
applied the statute of limitation prospectively, if the Court had not intended to retroactively
apply Delcostello. Smith, 747 F.2d at 375. But see Winston v. Sanders, 610 F. Supp. 176, 179
(C.D. Ill. 1985). The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois in Winston
v. Sanders held that DelCostello was not a break with precedent, but was merely a clarification
of existing statutory law. Winston, 610 F. Supp. at 179. The district court in Winston also
noted that the Supreme Court had foreshadowed the result in DelCostello in previous cases.
Id.; see United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60-64 (1981) (foreshadowing
Supreme Court's holding in DelCostello).
122. See Jones v. Shankland, No. 84-3623, (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 1986) (available Oct. 10,
1986, WEsTLAw, Allfeds library) (holding that Mulligan v. Hazard is authority in Sixth Circuit
for proposition that Wilson v. Garcia applies retroactively); Vodila v. Cleeland, No. 85-3641,
(6th Cir. Aug. 1, 1986) (available Oct. 10, 1986, WEsT.Aw, Allfeds library) (one-year limitations
period established by Mulligan v. Hazard for § 1983 actions brought in Ohio applies whether
or not plaintiff brought action before Supreme Court's decision in Wilson).
123. 787 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1986). In Anton v. Lehpamer, the plaintiff brought a § 1983
claim against police officers for using excessive force during plaintiff's arrest. Id. at 1141-42.
124. Id. at 1143. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Anton
v. Lehpamer held that, in evaluating the Chevron test, a circuit court should examine only
the precedent of the circuit in which the case arose, rather than the precedent in all circuits.
Id.
125. See Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that Illinois
residuary statute of limitations applies to all § 1983 actions brought in Illinois), cert. denied,
Mitchell v. Beard, 438 U.S. 907 (1978); see also Anton, 787 F.2d at 1144 (discussing Beard v.
Robinson's application to § 1983 claims brought in Illinois).
126. Anton, 787 F.2d at 1144.
127. Id. at 1145.
128. Id. at 1146. In Carpenter v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind.,the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana refused to apply the Wilson decision prospectively.
637 F. Supp. 889, 897 (N.D. Ind. 1986). In Carpenter, the district court performed an
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Seventh Circuit, however, was conscious of the mandate of the Supreme
Court in Wilson. 29 The Seventh Circuit held that, to implement the Wilson
decision as quickly as justice permits, an Illinois plaintiff whose section
1983 claim accrued before the Wilson decision must bring his action within
the shorter period of either five years from the date his action accrued or
two years after the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson. 30 By refusing to
apply the Wilson holding because the Chevron test counselled against
retroactive application, but also implementing the Wilson holding as quickly
as possible, the Seventh Circuit in Anton was as faithful to the Supreme
Court's Wilson holding as equity would allow.'
At first glance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit has inconsistently answered the question of whether Wilson should
receive retroactive application. In Wycoff v. Menke32 and Farmer v. Cook,33
the Eighth Circuit concluded that Wilson should receive retroactive appli-
cation. 34 In Ridgway v. Wapello County, 35 however, the Eighth Circuit
held that Wilson should receive prospective application. 36 A closer exami-
independent Chevron analysis and concluded that Wilson should receive retroactive application.
Id. The district court analyzed the Chevron test and determined that the first and third Chevron
factors favored retroactive application, while the second Chevron factor favored prospective
application. Id. at 896-897. The district court concluded that prospective application of Wilson
v. Garcia would be inappropriate because two of the three Chevron factors favored retroactive
application. Id. at 897.
129. See Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1949 (1985) (directing federal courts to apply
state personal injury statutes of limitation to § 1983 claims).
130. Anton, 787 F.2d at 1146. The Seventh Circuit's holding in Anton v. Lehpamer
applies only to plaintiffs who initiate a § 1983 action in Illinois. Id. The Anton court's holding
is a combination of the pre- Wilson statute of limitations and the post- Wilson statute of
limitations. Id. A plaintiff who initiates a § 1983 action in Illinois, therefore, may bring a §
1983 action if the plaintiff brings the action within the old five-year statute of limitations
established in Beard v. Robinson or within the new two-year limitations period established in
Anton. Id.; see Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1977) (five-year statute of
limitations is applicable to § 1983 actions brought in Illinois). The Anton court determined
that a plaintiff must bring his § 1983 action within the shorter period of the pre- Wilson five-
year statute of limitations or the post- Wilson two-year limitations period. Anton, 787 F.2d
at 1146.
131. See Anton, 787 F.2d at 1146 (discussing importance of implementing Supreme Court's
Wilson decision as quickly as justice permits).
132. 773 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 106 S.Ct. 1230 (1986). In Wycoffv. Menke,
the plaintiff, an inmate at the Iowa State Penitentiary, brought a § 1983 action claiming that
a prison official violated the plaintiff's fourteenth amendment right to due process by failing
to provide Wycoff with adequate procedural safeguards during his detention. Id. at 984.
133. 782 F.2d 780 (8th Cir. 1986). In Farmer v. Cook, the plaintiff brought a § 1983
action against the Independence, Missouri police department and individual police officers. Id.
at 984.
134. See Farmer, 782 F.2d at 781 (holding that Wilson should receive retroactive appli-
cation); Wycoff, 773 F.2d at 987 (same).
135. 795 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1986). In Ridgway v. Wapello County, the plaintiff, a mental
patient, brought a § 1983 action against county employees for unlawful search and seizure,
illegal confinement, and invasion of privacy. Id. at 647.
136. Id.
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nation of these cases, however, reveals that the difference in the Eighth
Circuit's holdings arises from facts particular to each case, rather than from
inconsistent analyses of the Wilson retroactivity question.
In Wycoff, the Eighth Circuit employed the Chevron test to answer the
retroactivity question. 37 In considering the first Chevron factor, the Eighth
Circuit concluded that no definitive standard existed upon which Wycoff
could have relied in waiting more than two years to file his section 1983
claim. 38 The Eighth Circuit held that the purposes underlying the Supreme
Court's decision in Wilson favored retroactive application, because retro-
active application would result in uniformity and certainty of section 1983
statute of limitations in future section 1983 claims and pending section 1983
claims sharing the same limitations period. 3 9 The Eighth Circuit also found
that retroactive application of Wilson would not be harsh or unjust because
Wycoff could not have relied on a limitations period longer than two years
in filing his claim. 40 The Eighth Circuit in Wycoff, therefore, held that the
Chevron test favors retroactive application of Wilson.' 4'
In Farmer v. Cook, the Eighth Circuit cited Wycoff with approvalY.4 2
In Farmer, however, Wilson's retroactive application revived, rather than
destroyed, the plaintiff's section 1983 claim. 143 Farmer's section 1983 action
was revived because the statute of limitations relied on by the defendant in
Farmer was shorter than the personal injury statute of limitations established
by the Supreme Court in Wilson. 4 Retroactive application of Wilson enables
the plaintiff to take advantage of the longer personal injury statute of
limitations; therefore, his action is not time barred.
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Ridgway, holding in favor of prospective
application of Wilson, is distinguishable from Wycoff and Farmer, despite
Ridgway's facial inconsistency with Eighth Circuit precedent. In Ridgway,
the plaintiff filed a section 1983 action after the Eighth Circuit's decision
in Garmon v. Foust 4 5 which uniformly characterized all section 1983 actions
137. Wycoff, 773 F.2d at 986.
138. Id. at 984-86. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Garmon v. Foust, decided that the forum state's
general residuary statute of limitations governed all § 1983 claims brought in the Eighth
Circuit. Id. at 984; see Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400, 406 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that
state's general catch-all statute of limitations, rather than state's personal injury statute of
limitations, governed § 1983 actions), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982). The Eighth Circuit in
Wycoff concluded that Wycoff could not have relied on Garmon because he filed his § 1983
claim before the Eighth Circuit's decision in Garmon. Wycoff, 773 F.2d at 984.
139. Wycoff, 773 F.2d at 986-87.
140. Id. at 987.
141. Id.
142. Farmer v. Cook, 782 F.2d 780, 780-81 (8th Cir. 1986).
143. See id. at 781 (retroactive application of Wilson revives otherwise time-barred action).
144. Id.
145. 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1982) cert. denied 456 U.S. 998 (1982). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided Garmon v. Foust on January 5, 1982. Id. at
400. In Ridgway v. Wapello County, the plaintiff filed her § 1983 claim in August of 1983.
795 F.2d 646, 647 (8th Cir. 1986).
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as falling under the state's general residuary statute of limitations.'46 Ridgway
reasonably could have relied on the five year residuary statute of limitations
established by Garmon, while Wycoff and Farmer, who filed their actions
prior to Garmon, could not. 147 Ridgway's reliance on the five-year statute
of limitations established in Garmon satisfied the first Chevron factor. 48 In
Ridgway, the Eighth Circuit held that the Chevron test's purpose factor
marginally favors retroactive application of Wilson because retroactive ap-
plication minimally contributes to the nationwide uniformity envisioned by
the Supreme Court in Wilson. 49 The Eighth Circuit concluded that Chev-
ron's equity factor favors prospective application of Wilson because Ridgway
reasonably relied on the five year statute of limitations established by the
Eighth Circuit in Garmon.'s0 The Eighth Circuit, therefore, applied Wilson
prospectively to save Ridgway's section 1983 claim.'' Ridgway's facial
inconsistency with Wycoff and Farmer results from different factual situa-
tions, rather than an inconsistent analysis of the Wilson retroactivity issue.
The approach of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit to the Wilson retroactivity issue is both original and faithful to the
purposes of the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Garcia. In Gibson
v. United States, 1s2 the Ninth Circuit held that a court should apply Wilson
retroactively when retroactive application will lengthen, rather than shorten,
the limitations period. 3 The Ninth Circuit in Gibson further held that,
when retroactive application will shorten the limitations period, Wilson
merits only prospective application.5 4 The Ninth Circuit' reasoned that
retroactive application inequitably would bar a plaintiff's right to his day
in court if the plaintiff timely filed his section 1983 action under the law
in effect at the time his section 1983 action commenced. 5 The Ninth Circuit
relied upon its earlier Wilson retroactivity decision in Rivera v. Green 56 for
146. Garmon, 668 F.2d at 406; see supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing
Eighth Circuit's holding in
Garmon).
147. Ridgway, 795 F.2d at 648.
148. Id.
149. Id.;.see Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1947 (1985) (discussing need for national
uniformity of § 1983 statute of limitations).
150. Ridgway, 795 F.2d at 648.
151. Id.
152. 781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986). In Gibson v. United States, the plaintiff brought a §
1983 action claiming that the federal government, the City of Los Angeles, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, and the Los Angeles Police Department conspired to violate her civil rights.
Id. at 1337.
153. Id. at 1339.
154. Id.
155. See id. (Ninth and Tenth Circuits reject retroactive application of Wilson if retroactive
application time bars plaintiff's claim).
156. 775 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 106 S.Ct. 1656.(1986). In Rivera v. Green,
the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action claiming that the Maricopa County, California Sheriff's
Department violated his civil rights by illegally searching his home and arresting him. Id. at
1382.
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this proposition.1 7 The Ninth Circuit in Rivera held that, in the absence of
substantial inequity to the defendants, the interests of section 1983 are best
served by retroactively applying Wilson to extend the statute of limitations
time period. 58 The Ninth Circuit, however, limited Rivera's holding to
situations in which retroactive application of Wilson would advance a
litigant's ability to pursue his section 1983 claim.' 59 The Ninth Circuit's
holdings in Gibson and Rivera are unique because the Ninth Circuit not
only applied the Chevron test, but also supported the spirit of the Wilson
decision by protecting the rights of federal civil rights litigants.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had an
advantage over other circuit courts in answering the Wilson retroactivity
question. By addressing the issue of retroactive application of Garcia v.
Wilson prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Garcia, the
Tenth Circuit was in a unique position to establish the standard to which
other circuits could refer. 16° The Tenth Circuit has not decided any cases
regarding the retroactivity issue since the Supreme Court's decision in
Wilson. Because the Tenth Circuit, in Garcia v. Wilson, created the doctrine
of characterizing all section 1983 claims as personal injury claims for statute
of limitations purposes,' 6' other circuit courts may find significant the fact
that the Tenth Circuit also determined that retroactive application of Garcia
was inappropriate.
In Jackson v. City of Bloomfield 62 the Tenth Circuit applied the
Chevron test to decide whether to retroactively apply its decision in Garcia.
6 3
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the first Chevron factor favored prospec-
tive application because Garcia was a clear break with Tenth Circuit
precedent. 64 Concerning the second Chevron factor, the Tenth Circuit held
that retroactive application of Garcia would not promote or hinder the
purposes of Garcia.'65 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the third factor of
the Chevron test favored prospective application of Garcia because retro-
157. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986); see Rivera v. Green,
775 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1985) (retroactive application of Wilson best serves interests of
§ 1983).
158. Rivera, 775 F.2d at 1384.
159. Id.; see supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing Rivera's limited holding).
160. See Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 652 (10th Cir. 1984). The Tenth
Circuit decided Garcia v. Wilson on March 30, 1984. 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984). On the
same date, the Tenth Circuit decided not to apply retroactively the Garcia holding in two
other cases. See Abbitt v. Franklin, 731 F.2d 661, 661 (10th Cir. 1984) (decided March 30,
1984); Jackson, 731 F.2d at 652 (same).
161. Garcia, 731 F.2d at 651.
162. 731 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1984). In Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, the plaintiff brought
a § 1983 action claiming that the City of Bloomfield wrongfully terminated the plaintiff's
employment for exercising her first amendment rights. Id. at 652-53.
163. Id. at 654-55.
164. Id.; see Garcia, 731 F.2d at 651 (overruling prior § 1983 statute of limitations
decisions that are inconsistent with Tenth Circuit's holding in Garcia).
165. Jackson, 731 F.2d at 655.
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active application would cause substantial inequity to a plaintiff whose
section 1983 actions accrued before the Tenth Circuit's decision in Garcia.166
The Tenth Circuit stated that, even if the first two Chevron factors favored
retroactive application, the inequity factor greatly outweighed the other two
factors and, therefore, the Tenth Circuit refused to apply retroactively its
decision in Garcia.'67
In Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin,166 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit first addressed the Wilson retroactivity issue. The
Eleventh Circuit concluded in a footnote that the Supreme Court's decision
in Wilson should receive retroactive application. 69 The Eleventh Circuit's
footnote merely stated that each of the Chevron factors favored retroactive
application. 70 In Williams v. City of Atlanta,'7' however, the Eleventh
Circuit set forth a comprehensive examination of whether the Chevron test
indicates that Wilson should receive retroactive application. 72 In Williams,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the first Chevron factor favored retroactive
application because the plaintiff could not cite a single Eleventh Circuit
precedent that delineated a limitations period analogous to the plaintiff's
claim.'7 The Eleventh Circuit also found that the second Chevron factor
favored retroactive application of Wilson because prospective application
would contravene the Wilson Court's holding that circuit courts should
apply the forum state's personal injury statute of limitations to all section
1983 claims. 7 4 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that prospective application
of Wilson would continue the practice of characterizing section 1983 claims
according to differing analogous statute of limitations schemes, a practice
that the Supreme Court in Wilson expressly rejected.75 In considering the
third Chevron factor, the Eleventh Circuit held that, despite the fact that
retroactive application would defeat the plaintiff's section 1983 claim,
retroactive application of Wilson would not be substantially inequitable to
the plaintiff because no Eleventh Circuit precedent gave the plaintiff reason
166. See id. (holding that barring plaintiff's action because statute of limitations changed
after plaintiff filed action is inequitable).
167. Id. The Tenth Circuit decided Abbitt v. Franklin on the same day it decided Jackson.
Abbitt v. Franklin, 731 F.2d 661, 661 (10th Cir. 1984). The Tenth Circuit in Abbitt restated
its position in Jackson and offered no new insight on the retroactivity issue. Id. at 662-64.
168. 763 F.2d 1250 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 106 S.Ct 893 (1986). In Jones v. Preuit
& Mauldin, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action claiming that the defendant obtained three
International Harvester cotton pickers through attachment proceedings that violated the plain-
tiff's due process rights. Id. at 1252.
169. Id. at 1253 n.2.
170. See id. (facts of Jones favor retroactive application of Wilson under Chevron test).
171. 794 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1986). In Williams v. City of Atlanta, the plaintiff brought
a § 1983 action claiming that local and federal law enforcement officials unconstitutionally
searched the plaintiff's home. Id. at 625.
172. See id. at 626-28 (applying Chevron test to facts of Williams).
173. Id. at 627.
174. Id. at 628.
175. Id. at 627-28; see Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1949 (1985) (§ 1983 claims are
best characterized as personal injury actions).
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to wait longer than two years to bring his section 1983 action. 76 In its
conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit observed that the majority of circuits
considering the retroactivity issue have applied Wilson v. Garcia retroac-
tively.
177
Justice White, dissenting from the Supreme Court's decision denying
certiorari to review the Sixth Circuit's decision in Mulligan v. Hazard,
observed that the differences between the circuit courts' retroactivity deci-
sions are unlikely to disappear without guidance from the Supreme Court. 
7
Justice White is correct in his assessment of the future of the Wilson
retroactivity issue. Based on the preceding survey of circuit court decisions,
the gap separating the circuit courts will not close by itself. The width of
the gap ranges from a presumption of retroactivity in the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits to a presumption in the Ninth Circuit that the plaintiff is entitled
to the longest limitations period that equity will permit. Faced with this
disparity, only action by the Supreme Court can effectively bring uniformity
to the Wilson retroactivity issue.
The Supreme Court has two options concerning the Wilson retroactivity
issue. First, the Court could grant certiorari to an appropriate case and
expressly decide the retroactivity issue. Alternatively, the Court could ignore
the retroactivity issue because the retroactivity question eventually will
become moot as section 1983 claims accrue after the Supreme Court's
decision in Wilson v. Garcia.
The circuit courts follow three different methods for analyzing the
Wilson retroactivity issue. The first method is the "implied retroactivity"
method of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits. 179 The "implied retroactivity"
method presumes that the Wilson decision should receive retroactive appli-
cation. The "implied retroactivity" method seems ill advised. The existence
of the Chevron test indicates that the presumption of retroactivity that
accompanies judicial decisions is not automatic or absolute.
80
The second method for analyzing the Wilson retroactivity issue is the
strict Chevron analysis method embraced by the First, Third, Seventh,
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.' The strict Chevron analysis method
requires a court to review prior circuit cases to determine whether clear
176. See Williams, 794 F.2d at 628 (noting that no precedent existed on which plaintiff
could rely in waiting longer than two years to file § 1983 claim).
177. Id.
178. Mulligan v. Hazard, 106 S. Ct. 2903, 2903 (1986) (White, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); see supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text (discussing Sixth Circuit's decision
in Mulligan).
179. See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text (discussing implied retroactivity
method).
180. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-08 (1971) (discussing Supreme
Court's test for determining whether courts should retroactively apply federal courts' civil
decisions).
181. See supra notes 82-113, 123-51 & 162-77 and accompanying text (discussing strict
Chevron analysis).
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precedent exists on which the litigant detrimentally relied.8 2 The strict
Chevron analysis method is superior to the "implied retroactivity" method
of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits because the strict Chevron analysis method
considers the plaintiff's reliance on pre- Wilson statute of limitations, the
purpose of the court's decision, and whether retroactive application works
a substantial inequity on the plaintiff.
The third method is the "equitable retroactivity" method created by
the Ninth Circuit."" The "equitable retroactivity" method requires courts
to apply Wilson retroactively only if retroactivity would lengthen the statute
of limitations.1 84 The "equitable retroactivity" method incorporates the
Chevron factors while concurrently considering the equitable nature of
section 1983. While the strict Chevron method is superior to the "implied
retroactivity" method because it takes equity into account, the "equitable
retroactivity" method is superior to both the "implied retroactivity" method
and the strict Chevron method. The "equitable retroactivity" method is
superior because it provides further protection for the section 1983 plaintiff.
The further protection is provided by forcing many defendants of section
1983 actions to defend the action on its merits, rather than relying on the
disfavored statute of limitations defense. If an expired statute of limitations
bars a plaintiff from federal court, the plaintiff loses his only recourse to
an impartial forum when bringing an action against a state. The "equitable
retroactivity" method also safeguards the right of the defendant to rely on
preexisting limitations periods. The Ninth Circuit applies the "equitable
retroactivity" method only when it is not substantially inequitable to the
defendant.'85 The "equitable retroactivity" method better promotes the
equitable purposes of section 1983 and the Wilson v. Garcia decision than
either the "implied retroactivity" method or the strict Chevron method
adopted by the other circuit courts.
SEVN A. BROECKAERT
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text (discussing equitable retroactivity
method).
184. Id.
185. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (noting that equitable retroactivity method
safeguards defendant's right to rely on statutes of limitation).
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